In this paper, we reexamine the question "Why doesn't capital ßow from rich to poor countries?" posed by Lucas (1990) . Our Þndings suggest that even if capital ßows freely it will ßow to middle income countries rather than to poor countries. We start with the stylized fact that poorer countries have high intermediation costs, and develop a simple disaggregation of the neoclassical production function based on a model of costly intermediation of funds between safe and risky projects when there is ex ante heterogeneity of project potential. When intermediation costs are ignored, the model behaves much like the neoclassical model in terms of capital returns. However, when intermediation costs are considered, the return for a given amount of capital can be non-monotonic in costs. Therefore, the combination of capital and cost differences across countries gives rise to a rich variation of returns, one that suggests a tendency for capital to ßow to middle income countries, as seen in data. Indeed, when we embed the static return function in a two-country dynamic model, there is capital outßow from a poor country that removes capital controls and becomes open. We Þnd that even though the closed economy dominates in terms of capital employed in production, it is the open economy that dominates in terms of income, consumption and welfare.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the role of intermediation costs in explaining capital ßows across rich, middle income and poor countries. We present evidence to support the stylized fact that poorer countries have high intermediation costs. We supplement this with the stylized fact that capital mainly ßows from the rich to middle income rather than the poorest countries. We develop a simple disaggregation of the neoclassical production function based on a model of intermediation of funds between safe and risky projects, when there is ex ante heterogeneity of project potential. Intermediation of funds to the risky project are assumed to involve higher resource costs than intermediation to safe projects. As a Þrst step in connecting the above-mentioned facts, we consider the static returns in a closed environment, both with and without project potential being observable by the intermediary. Later we embed the static return function in a two-country dynamic model to get implications on the dynamics of capital ßows. Our quantitative exercise is in the spirit of and a substantial generalization of the question posed by Lucas (1990) , who asked why capital does not ßow from the rich to poor countries as predicted by the neoclassical model.
The neoclassical model is widely used for transitional analysis but has counterfactual implications for the rates of return. One of our aims is to offer an aggregate production function that is quite similar in form but has different properties for rates of return. Indeed, the reduced-form production function of our model looks very similar to the standard aggregate neoclassical production function, but its total factor productivity (TFP) and rates of return are endogenously determined based on the mix of safe and risky projects undertaken in response to varying intermediation costs. 1 When intermediation costs are ignored, and variations in the dimension of physical capital alone are considered, the model behaves exactly like the neoclassical model in terms of capital returns where poor countries dominate all other countries in rates of return to capital. However, when intermediation costs are considered two effects emerge. For a given level of capital, when costs increase, there is a substitution of funds from risky to safe projects, which given the neoclassical technology results in a decrease in the marginal return. At the same time there is a decrease in the net funds available for intermediation, which tends to increase the marginal return to capital (an "income effect"). These opposing effects make the return for a given amount of capital non-monotonic in costs and their relative strengths depend on the amount of capital. Therefore, the combination of capital and cost differences across countries gives rise to a rich variation of returns.
When project potential is unobserved, there is an additional effect that contributes to the variation of returns. In this case, the optimal Þnancial contract has to choose a single level of funding for the risky projects, balancing the need to constrain funding of near-marginal projects while not choking off high potential projects. An increase in intermediation costs, which increases the threshold potential of risky projects, decreases the heterogeneity of these projects and make the informational problem less severe.
The bulk of the paper involves presenting and discussing returns for various, empirically relevant, physical and human capital, and intermediation cost combinations for the above economies. We show that the model is able to quantitatively generate returns that are consistent with the stylized fact on capital ßows, where middle income countries dominate in returns over a large range of intermediation costs we think are empirically plausible. The model also produces aggregate measures for intermediation costs to quantity intermediated, bankruptcy costs, and TFP, that are empirically plausible. It is important to point out that, there may be various arguments including corruption, sovereign risk, lack of legal institutions etc., that could play a role in explaining why capital doesn't ßow to poor countries. However, what we are able to show is that, a small extension of the neoclassical model which incorporates measured intermediation costs may be capable of accounting for the low returns in poor countries. All the other factors can of course enhance these return differences.
When we embed the static returns from a closed environment in a twocountry dynamic model, we show that unlike the standard model, capital will ßow from the richest country to the middle income country rather than to the poorest country until an integrated steady state is reached. In getting this path for capital, we assume that the poorest countries have controls to prevent capital outßow. More interesting and unusual is an experiment in which the poor country removes such controls, that is becomes more "open", and there is capital outßow to the richer country. We compare this transition to that of a closed economy and show that even though the closed economy dominates in terms of capital employed in production, it is the open economy that dominates in terms of income and consumption.
Throughout the paper, we consider capital ßows for efficiency reasons rather than consumption insurance. (See Obstfeld, 1995 , for an exposition on international capital ßows.) Given our concern with ßow of capital from rich to poor countries rather than among rich countries, we feel that ßow for efficiency reasons is of greater importance than ßow for diversiÞcation reasons. Obstfeld cites the work by Lucas (1990) and King and Rebelo (1993) to point out the problem inherent in using the simple neoclassical aggregate production function to calculate returns -it ignores multiple production activities with different capital requirements, a situation that could result in different aggregate capitaloutput ratios but similar factor returns. Our work stays very close in spirit to the standard neoclassical production function, but by considering a simple disaggregation of production shows one way of avoiding this pitfall. In closely related work, Zebregs (1999) uses a model in which domestic and foreign capital are imperfect substitutes in production, and have an elasticity of substitution that varies with a country's technology gap with respect to developed countries. We have identical technology parameters across countries and instead consider variations in costs of intermediation observed across countries, to get variation in returns that are driven mainly by the mix of productive projects undertaken. Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) construct a two-country model which features diminishing returns and production risk, both of which provide incentives for investors in rich countries to invest in poor countries. However, this is countered by sovereign country risk which tempers the ßow, especially during times of "crises". They report that twice a century occurrence of international crises is enough to generate empirically plausible ßows between the "North", which owns 80% of the total capital stock, and the "South". While they take the view that human capital and quality of institutions may be unrelated to the foreign asset positions, we Þnd that when we proxy quality of institutions by intermediation costs these variables can go a substantial way in accounting for return patterns across countries that are consistent with the observed ßow of capital from rich to middle income countries, a primary focus of our work.
In Section 2, we present two stylized facts, one on the direction of capital ßows, which we hope to match, and another on intermediation costs, which we will appeal to while constructing our model. We start Section 3 by reexamining returns in a simple neoclassical aggregate production function as Lucas (1990) does, but using more recent data on human capital for a cross section of countries. We then consider a more disaggregated situation in which entrepreneurs engage in safe and risky projects. We initially assume away informational problems in project funding and examine returns to capital. Besides being analytically amenable, this setup shows that the particular form of the intermediation structure assumed does not matter for most of the results. Later we relax this full information assumption and consider contracts that are more typically found in the Þnancial intermediation literature. With this static apparatus in place, we turn, in Section 4, to examining the ßow of capital over time when a rich and poor country with potentially different intermediation costs are integrated. Section 5 deals with sensitivity analysis, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Stylized Facts

On Capital Flows
The 2000 World Development Indicators reports that the net private capital ßows (which include private debt ßows and private nondebt ßows such as foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment), was 14.8 Billion dollars for "low" income countries and 27.8 Billion dollars for "middle" income countries in the year 1990. The difference in net inßow is even more stark for 1998, 52.4 Billion dollars and 215.3 Billion dollars being the respective Þgures. Zebregs (1998) documents the inßow of foreign direct investment (FDI) for high, low, and middle income countries. For the period 1990 through 1994, net FDI inßow, in billions of dollars, for the high-income countries was -304.2 Billion dollars.
For the low and middle income countries gross inßow was 98.3 and 155.7 Billion dollars, respectively. An outßow of 55.2 Billion dollars is reported for developing countries as a whole. Even if this entire outßow is attributed to the middle income countries in that group, the net inßow to the middle income countries is higher than it is to the low income countries. In summary, it seems safe to conclude that there is a greater tendency for capital to ßow from the rich countries to the middle income countries. Later, we will argue that the basic neoclassical model will be unable to account for this pattern of ßows. Figure 1 displays the relationship between intermediation costs and per capita GNP for 109 countries. The data for intermediation costs are obtained from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) . They report two measures for the efficiency of banks. The net interest margin equals the accounting value of a bank's net interest revenue as a share of its total assets, and overhead costs equals the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of its total assets. For most countries there is data from 1990 to 1997. We have plotted the average intermediation cost, measured two different ways, for the time period available against the PPP-adjusted value of GDP in 1997. A negative relationship between income and cost is discernible, consistent with evidence presented in Erosa (1998) 3 . From this evidence, we take away the stylized fact that resource costs of intermediation are higher in poorer countries. 4 The countries for which both intermediation costs and per capita GDP are both low do not Þt this negative pattern. Some of the countries in this range are Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, Jordan, and Yemen. It is important to note that the costs as presented here (in the absence of direct evidence on costs, the only type of cross-country data available) should be viewed as resources actually spent on intermediation in equilibrium. If high direct costs of intermediation cause very few projects to be undertaken, one could Þnd costs or resources spent to be very low. As we will see, our model is capable of producing such an outcome. In 2 Since we will have nothing to say about capital ßows that occurs among rich countries for reasons of portfolio diversiÞcation or production specialization, we are concerned with net capital inßows into countries rather than gross ßows. The total ßow from the developed to other countries is indicative of pool of funds available in the world. We are then concerned with where these funds ßow; given this, we have presented evidence on absolute ßows. It is not immediately obvious to us that we should instead consider the ßow as a fraction of the GDP of recipient countries; if anything, the neoclassical theory would suggest that the low-capital, low-GDP countries should receive most of the ßows.
On Intermediation Costs
3 Erosa (1998) examines data from the United Nations for 1985. We have also examined that data set which has information for 42 countires, some going back to 1960's. We used bank service charges divided by assets of the banks as a proxy for costs and obtained results very similar to those presented in Figure 1 . 4 A nagging question raised by evidence such as this is one of causality. Does Þnancial development cause economic growth and development or the other way around? Several papers have studied evidence such as this using formal econometrics. Two recent papers that have examined this question and come to the conclusion that causality indeed runs from Þnancial development to economic development are Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). other words, even though the cost parameters we use in the model stand in for unobserved costs of intermediation, they give rise to equilibrium expenditures which can then be compared with data summarized in Figure 1 for assessing the empirical plausibility of the model. 
GDP-per capita and Overhead Costs
Returns to Capital in a Static Environment
In order to present quantitative results on capital returns, we use per worker capital levels in 1985 from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) . In order to smooth out highly idiosyncratic country elements, we group the countries into quartiles from lowest to highest levels of physical capital per worker. 5 In Table  1 , we present the relative levels of physical capital (k), human capital ¡ h 1−α ¢ , GDP (y), as well as y/k, all in per worker terms and averaged across countries within the group.
Huge differences in capital and income can be seen across countries in this table. The per worker physical capital in the richest group is about 40 times that of the poorest group. The corresponding ratios for the human capital factor and per worker GDP are more than 7 and 13. 
Neoclassical Production Function
Consider the simple neoclassical aggregate production function in its intensive (per unit labor) form for a given country i:
The return to capital is simply given by the marginal product of capital as αA i k α−1 i
. Suppose the technology parameter was the same across all countries. Assume the capital intensity parameter to be 0.35, a fairly standard value. The ratios of capital returns of the poorer country groups to that of the richest country group are given below in the second column of Table 2 for this case. The relative per worker capital levels roughly correspond to the capital differences in Table 1. 6 If the only difference between countries was in their capitallabor ratios, the return to capital in the lowest income countries would be 11 times higher than the return in the highest income countries. According to these results, all capital would have to ßow solely to low income countries. The lack of ßows commensurate with such differentials is what motivated Lucas (1990) to ask why capital does not ßow from rich to poor countries.
Suppose we now write the above production function as y i = Ah
, where h i is the per worker (or average) human capital in country i, and A is a common technology factor across all countries. The third column of Table 2 shows returns for this case. Including differences in human capital reduces the difference in the returns between the richest and poorest countries to a factor of 1.54. The ordering of relative returns is preserved, and all capital should still ßow to the poorest countries. Even if output is written as y = k α (· · · ), where
we are agnostic about the other production inputs, one gets the expression for marginal return of capital given as, r = α k/y . Using the relative capital-to-output ratios for the four quartiles, as calculated from Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) and given in the last column of Table 1 , we get the return in the poorest countries to be 2.9 times higher than the return in the highest income countries; see the last column of Table 2 . 7 We now proceed by considering a simple disaggregation of the production function that allows the rate of return to be inßuenced not only by the levels of physical and human capital but also by the mix of safe and risky projects undertaken in the economy.
Full Information Model with Safe and Risky Projects
Individuals
The economy is populated by an inÞnitely-lived representative consumer. The consumer has a standard utility function, earns interest income from intermediated capital and has to decide between consumption and saving. There is a continuum of one-period lived, risk neutral, entrepreneurs whose measure is normalized to one. The entrepreneurs are born without any endowment except for human capital and have to fund their projects with physical capital borrowed from the intermediary. They can undertake either a safe project (an "old" technology) or a risky project (a "new" technology); the technology is described in greater detail below. Each entrepreneur is indexed by her potential to succeed in the risky project, which is denoted by a. We normalize a ² [0, 1] 8 . The distribution of this potential ("ability") in the population of entrepreneurs is denoted by F , the density of which is given by f, and is assumed to be continuous and strictly positive in [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs decide on their projects at the beginning of the period, borrow and invest the proceeds, and consume their output net of repayment at the end of the period. Notice that in this economy physical capital is supplied by consumers and human capital is supplied by entrepreneurs.
Technology
The entrepreneurs can undertake a project with a tried and tested safe technology ("farm"), or a risky new technology ("factory"). 
, for a given level 7 One could proceed further, by assuming A is different across countries as well, but given our objective of using quantities that are directly measurable or estimable, we do not do so. Since A is typically calculated as a residual, using the levels of income, physical capital, and human capital as inputs, it is not clear that much can be gained by calculating capital return using such a measure of A. 8 We further assume that for any given ability there is a measure one of entrepreneurs. This is a purely technical assumption that allows the law of large numbers to be used in (1). of capital employed, i; when the new technology is implemented successfully it yields a higher output than the existing technology, but it can also fail on account of misadoption, problems inherent to untried technologies, and plain bad luck. Even though we will present the model for a general Y L , we will often specialize to the case of Y L = 0. We also assume that the above relationship among the three types of projects holds for marginal yields :
H (i), ∀ i, and that the three production functions are strictly concave.
An entrepreneur of ability a has a probability π (a) of succeeding, that is, getting the high output, when she undertakes the risky project. We assume that 0 < π (a) < 1, π 0 (a) > 0, and π (0) = 0. This ability is meant to proxy differences in managerial talent, as well as luck or project potential. Entrepreneurial ability is irrelevant for the successful execution of a safe project.
Financial Intermediation
Since there is idiosyncratic risk in this environment, there is a role for intermediation -by pooling risks, an intermediary can guarantee a certain return to a consumer who wants to invest in the entrepreneurs' projects. Entrepreneurs, who are born without any endowment, are the borrowers from the intermediary. Consumers, who want to intertemporally smooth their consumption, invest with the intermediary. As mentioned earlier, we assume that the ability a of any loan applicant is perfectly observed by the intermediary. We will relax this assumption in the next subsection when we look at the solution for an information constrained economy. Intermediation for the risky projects is costly. For a risky loan of i * , the cost of intermediation is assumed to be e A + e B i * . This cost structure has a Þxed component to account for intermediation costs such as loan setup costs, administrative overhead, bureaucratic inefficiency, and project viability studies. We see this as the main cost component. The variable part of the cost is included to account for the fact that larger loans (larger projects) are generally more complex and require more careful evaluation and loan management. We use these cost parameters to proxy for the state of Þnancial development of an economy. A country with a better intermediation infrastructure is expected to have lower costs of intermediation. These costs represent the amount lost in the intermediation process and do not contribute directly to production. The safe projects cost nothing to intermediate. 9 In the interest of tying parameters to observables, we interpret our costs as intermediation costs. In principle, e A , e B , could stand in for other costs, such as project setup and execution costs which are greatly affected by the business environment in a country, taxes on the intermediation sector, and other institutional factors for which data is typically hard to Þnd.
We assume that this cost is borne completely by the entrepreneurs. That is, this cost can be viewed as the cost of participating in the Þnancial sector and qualifying for a loan. Given that entrepreneurs are born with no endowment and depend on borrowed funds to start the project, this seems a reasonable assumption to make. Therefore, any entrepreneur who undertakes the risky project will actually borrow (e A + (1 + e B ) i * ) from the intermediary, out of which only i * will be directly productive. In order to impose some discipline in assuming varying cost structures across countries, we will often consider the case where Þxed and variable costs are perfectly correlated, e B = κe A .
We also assume that all capital employed locally has to be intermediated locally. How valid is this assumption given the prevalence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ßows? Fernandez-Arias and note that Þ-nancing through FDI does not completely preclude local intermediation since foreign companies may "hedge their earnings and protect the value of their assets, or outright speculate, by borrowing in domestic currency and pledging physical capital as collateral." On a related note, Feldstein (1994) reports that by the end of 1989, net external Þnance from US parents for their affiliates abroad was $227 Billion, while those from non-US sources, mostly in the form of debt, was $659 Billion. Moreover, as Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) note there appears no systematic relationship between FDI's share and Þnan-cial development. Therefore, in studying the effect of intermediation costs on capital ßows, it appears we are not missing a Þrst order or a systematic effect by ignoring FDI.
The intermediary performs a minimal role in the full information economy, structuring contracts contingent on observed ability to achieve an optimal allocation of funds. Since the intermediation occurs within the period, it can be studied in a static setting, separate from the intertemporal decision making of the consumer; that is, we can study how any available amount, k t , is intermediated without regard to the determination of the amount itself. The rate of return that arises from the intermediation process can then be embedded in a typical consumer's intertemporal problem. This simpliÞes the analysis considerably. 10 Moreover, it allows us to be agnostic on the source of funds -they can be domestic or foreign. All that we require is that intermediation is a "nontradeable" -all evaluation, screening, and monitoring of projects has to be done locally.
The Optimal Allocation
If there is free entry into the intermediation sector, one would expect the contracts offered to exhaust all gains from trade. We therefore solve for the contracts offered by maximizing the total surplus to the intermediary and the en- 10 An obvious future step is to use ideas from the dynamic contract literature in this quantiÞcation exercise. Allen and Gale (2000) note that except for Japan, retentions are the most important source of Þnance (but loans are also important). For this reason, the dynamics of Þrm behavior is likely to be important for aggregate returns. However, as Allen and Gale (2000) also note, "... the Þrm can be regarded as a "Þnancial" institution that overcomes the limitations of Þnancial markets in the same way that intermediaries do." (pp. 21). Inasmuch as inefficiencies and costs affect the allocation of funds whether intermediated from within or without, the model presented here is likely to be applicable.
trepreneurs. When a = 0, π, the probability of success in the risky project is zero, so it is clear that the lowest potential entrepreneur should be funded for the safe project and not the risky project. Given the properties of π and the production technology, it is evident that for any given level of risky investment,
is increasing in a. We should therefore expect a threshold level of risky project potential a * , below which projects will be funded only for the safe technology. With this in mind, and appealing to the law of large numbers, we write the optimal problem as:
subject to the resource constraint:
The objective function takes into account the possibility that investment in a risky project is commensurate with project potential, since this potential is fully observable. The resource constraint takes into account the "iceberg" costs involved in intermediating the risky projects. The Þrst order conditions for this problem are:
where use is made of the strict positivity of f , and a * > 0, and (4) holds with equality if a * < 1. The condition for i * (a) asserts that the marginal products of all risky projects are equalized, and equal to the marginal product of the safe project to the factor (1 + e B ). Given π 0 > 0, and the concavity of the production technology, we get i * (a) is strictly increasing in a. The condition for a * asserts that the marginal risky project is as proÞtable as the safe project. All else being equal, an increase in the intermediation cost parameters, e A , e B , exerts an upward pressure on the quality of the marginal project a * . For high enough costs, it is not proÞtable to fund risky projects even for the most able entrepreneur, and (4) is an inequality.
Let us brießy examine the decentralization that can support these allocations. Given the equalization of the marginal products across all risky projects to that of the safe project, we expect a decentralization in which all agents face the same interest rate r, and are free to choose their investment levels. An entrepreneur who chooses the safe project sets e i so that Y 
The Þrst order condition for this problem corresponds to (3) from the optimal problem. An entrepreneur decides to choose the risky project over the safe project if the maximized expected proÞt from the above problem is greater than or equal to the safe project proÞt, with the marginal entrepreneur indifferent to the type of project. The condition for the marginal entrepreneur corresponds to (4). For our purposes, the most important observation is that the marginal return to capital is given by
In what follows, we show that:
• Without intermediation costs, the model behaves like a neoclassical model, where increases in the total capital stock decreases the return.
• Increases in e A have two opposing effects on e i which make the returns non-monotonic in e A .
• Finally, we use a parametric example to quantify the above effects in order to see the variation in returns as k t and e A are both varied.
Analysis:
We now turn to a more formal analysis. It is possible to get a sharper characterization of the optimal allocations as well as the investor's return to funds by specializing to:
, with A L < A < A H where h is the level of human capital.
11
. The marginal cost of funds, λ, is given by αA e i
. The capital intensity in the production function, 0 < α < 1, is assumed to be constant across production functions. We also assume that ability is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and the function that maps ability into success is π (a) = a. We have f (a) = 1, and F (a) = a. The marginal condition (3) then becomes:
The investment in the risky project increases with quality in a convex fashion. In addition, as a * gets closer to 1, average funding of the risky project increases.
12
Evaluating (5) at the threshold quality, and using the result in (4), we get the following equation:
11 In our experiments there will be no intersectoral differences in human capital within a country. This speciÞcation for human capital has the advantages of simplicity, direct comparability with previous studies such as Lucas (1990) , and allows one to use estimates of average human capital based on schooling measures, say from Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) or Barro and Lee (1996) . However, it does not fully exploit the possibilities of the model. Assuming that higher human capital increases the probability of success in risky projects is an alternate approach and one that is likely to enhance our results. 12 The average funding of the risky project, given by
, is increasing in a * .
where:
is a factor that captures the quality of the risky pool and is increasing in a * . The left hand side of (6) is the ratio of proÞt from the threshold risky project to that of the safe project, which has to equal one if any risky project is undertaken at all; if it is less than one even for the most able entrepreneur (a * = 1), say when costs are high, no risky projects are undertaken. If the only cost is the variable cost, the second term drops out, and we can see a * , the threshold quality of risky projects, increases with e B . Higher the cost, higher the marginal quality has to be to break even in an expected sense. For a given safe project investment, e i, we can also see that an increase in e A increases a * . In the appendix, we formally take into account the variation of safe investment, e i , with e A and show:
We now turn to the determination of e i itself for a given amount of available capital, k t . Use (5) in (2), perform the integration and simplify to get:
where,
Γ (a * ), a factor that is decreasing in a * , captures the extensive margin of funding; when multiplied by e i, gives the total investment net of Þxed costs in both types of projects. The Þrst term within curly braces is the measure of safe projects and the second term, which drives the overall decrease, is the measure of risky projects adjusted for the increased investment in these projects relative to the safe project. Equations (6) and (7) can be solved for a * and e i, and the latter can be used in (5) to get the i * (a) function. In particular, note from (7), as a * → 1, (no risky projects undertaken), e i → k t , and total output is given by Ak
It is in this sense, the more general case of a * < 1 gives rise to a "disaggregated" production function.
Before we get into details of solutions to these equations, it is of interest to look at the case where intermediation cost parameters are zero. In this case, (6) reduces to a * A H + (1 − a * ) A L = A, and Γ (a * ) reduces to:
, a constant that depends only on the technology parameters, and (7) reduces to Γ 0 e i = k t . In other words, the safe project investment is directly proportional to k t . From the above discussion it follows the marginal return is inversely proportional to the capital, as in the standard neoclassical production function. So, if the aim is to go beyond that function for return implications, we need to consider the case where non-zero intermediation costs affect the mix of projects undertaken. It can be shown that ∂a * ∂k < 0; i.e. a capital rich country will have a greater fraction of risky projects. What happens when k t is given and the cost parameter e A is varied? Write (7) as:
There are two effects of an increase in e A : (1) It increases the cost of funding each risky project, and causes a substitution away from them into safe projects. In the above expression, an increase in a * causes the extensive factor Γ (a * ) to decrease, thereby tending to increase e i. As the safe project is funded more intensively, the marginal return of capital, αA e i
) e A decreases, the earlier effect is reinforced. However, if the elasticity of a * with respect to e A is small, (1 − a * (e A )) e A could increase, causing e i to drop; this could be thought of as an "income" effect caused by the scarcity of net funds. The marginal return αA e i α−1 h 1−α then increases. In the appendix, we show
The Þrst effect mentioned above, which increases e i and decreases return, is thus weaker for capital-rich countries as one might intuitively expect. We should therefore expect to see a more prominent increasing portion in the return curve for such countries. These opposing effects can make returns to capital non-monotonic in intermediation costs. In the appendix, we show the variation of e i with costs is governed by:
For a * close to zero (very low intermediation costs and high level of capital), the second term is more likely to dominate and
could become negative. In terms of the earlier discussion and the cross-partial result, it is for such countries that the elasticity of a * with respect to e A is likely to be the lowest and the second effect dominates. For a * → 1 (which occurs when intermediation costs are very high and capital level is low), ∂ e i ∂e A > 0 and the Þrst effect dominates.
The safe project investment e i is then U-shaped in e A and the marginal return to capital inverse U-shaped in e A . 13 One could seek conditions under which certain (k t , e A ) combinations dominate in return; but given our demonstration of non-monotonicity in this return, it is not clear this approach is likely to shed any sharper insights. We instead turn to computing the returns for calibrated parameters. Before we do that, we note a few points of relevance. First, we can substitute from (5) into the objective function, and derive the following compact expression for output:
Note the similarity with the neoclassical production function except for the endogenously determined factor, Γ (a * ) . Second, we can derive a measure for TFP in the aggregate sense by using the above expression for y, and using (7), we can see
Two countries that have the same amount of k and h can have different measures of TFP if their intermediation costs are different due to the differing mix of projects undertaken. Finally, we present an expression for the intermediary's share of output for a given level of capital. Using (5) and (6), we can show that the expected proÞt of any risky entrepreneur is given by (1 − α) A e i α h 1−α , which implies we can write:
Now that we have qualitatively demonstrated that differences in intermediation costs can give rise to non-monotonic returns, we would like to turn to data to parametrize this environment in order to investigate how the returns in low, middle, and rich income countries vary with respect to each other.
Quantitative Results
As a starting point for our quantitative results we consider countries that differ with respect to their physical and human capital levels. In order to reduce the number of parameters to seek, we assume A L = 0. The calibration of the remaining technology parameters, A, A H , are such that the k/y ratio and the gross return for the richest (k = 1) group of countries when intermediation is costless (when e A , e B , zero) are around 3 and 16% respectively. The values used are, A = 0.2462, A H = 0.5459, with A H /A being 2.2. As mentioned earlier, we use α = 0.35. In the absence of evidence on the split between Þxed and variable costs, we set the parameter κ to 0.1; that is the variable cost per unit investment in the risky project is taken to be 10% of the Þxed cost. Completely eliminating this part of the cost will not alter the return patterns.
It is worth emphasizing that the above technology parameters are held constant across countries in the quantitative exercises that follow; only the intermediation costs and the level of capital, which are empirically observable quantities, are varied.
The returns for this case are obtained by solving (6) and (7), and using r = αA e i α−1 h 1−α , for various levels of intermediation costs and by using differences in human capital as estimated by Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) 14 . Table 3 displays the returns where the return in the highest income country with zero intermediation costs is normalized to be 1. In the Þrst row the intermediation cost is set equal to zero. The results for this case indicate that the return to the intermediary for the lowest income country would be 1.5 times higher than the return in the highest income country. Notice that this result is same as the return differences presented in Table 2 for the neoclassical production function with differences in k and h. This is expected since in our model the aggregate production function has the standard neoclassical form when intermediation costs are zero. However, once we consider intermediation costs above zero we notice important differences between the implications of this model and the neoclassical model. Figure 2 shows the information in Table 3 graphically. We can see that if all the countries have an intermediation cost of 0.064 or higher, the return in the second lowest income country becomes higher than the return in the lowest 14 Notice that these experiments are not at all equivalent to assuming a simple production function with only variable costs such as: A ³ k 1+e B´α h 1−α . In such a setting, for measured differences in k and h between the poorest and richest countries, the rates of return are equalized only when intermediation costs to quantity is of the order of 240%, a highly implausible value. Moreover, such a set up misses out on the middle income countries having the highest returns.
income country. These results indicate that capital differences are such that the intermediary's return will be higher in the middle income country even if all the countries have the same intermediation costs, as long as these costs are higher than some threshold level. For example, if the intermediation costs are between 0.064 and 0.144, the second lowest income country will have the highest returns. On the other hand, for intermediation costs above 0.144, countries in the third category dominate in returns to the intermediary. In addition, if we assume differences in intermediation costs, we can easily obtain cases where the rate of return in the two middle income countries dominate the rate of return in the lowest income country. When compared to the pure neoclassical model displayed in Table 2 , we are able to observe interesting differences in cross country returns to capital once we consider the possibility of differences in intermediation costs. In summary we can see that a small extension of the neoclassical model which incorporates measured intermediation costs may be capable of accounting for the low return in poor countries. In addition, when we open up these economies, we will obtain capital ßows similar to what we see in the data. But before we proceed to the dynamic analysis, we ask if the above Þndings survive the generalization of the model to contracts that are more typically found in the Þnancial intermediation literature.
An Information Constrained Economy
In this section we relax the assumption that project potential is observable. While the demographics and production technology are identical to the full information economy, the remaining characteristics of such an economy are quite different.
Financial Intermediation
At the beginning of time t consumers arrive into period with assets (capital) k t , which they "deposit" with the intermediary, who guarantees them a certain rate of return r, on their deposits. In addition, at the beginning of time t, entrepreneurs are born and realize abilities to manage a risky project. We assume that the potential of an entrepreneur to succeed in a risky project is information that is private to the entrepreneur. While the Þnancial intermediary can observe costlessly the type of project undertaken ("farm" versus "factory"), he cannot observe the ability of the entrepreneur borrowing to invest in a factory at any cost. Given the inÞnite cost of ascertaining ability of the entrepreneurs, the intermediary cannot make a loan for a risky project that depends on ability. Instead, the Þnancial contract offered by the intermediary to anyone who undertakes the risky project is given by the pair (i * , r r ), where i * is the amount lent for production, and r r is the interest rate charged. For the safe project the intermediary offers loans at the rate r s . Entrepreneurs sign contracts (borrow) that are appropriate for the projects undertaken. The loan market clears -funds available for investment, k t , equals the total amount of funds demanded by the safe and risky entrepreneurs (including cost of intermediation borne by those who undertake the risky projects). Risky projects succeed or fail. Claims of failure are inspected by the intermediary at a cost µ and any output and all capital is appropriated by the intermediary. Claims of success are accompanied by debt repayment with the interest stipulated by the contract. Entrepreneurs who undertook the safe projects also repay their debt with interest. Entrepreneurs who undertook the safe project or succeeded in implementing the risky one consume output net of debt repayment; failed entrepreneurs consume nothing. All entrepreneurs die at the end of the period. 16 Why cannot the intermediary design an ability-varying contract, where agents truthfully announce a, and get a corresponding (i * , r r ), with both of them varying (presumably increasing) in a? It is easiest to examine this issue when Y L = 0, though in the appendix we argue that for small enough positive perturbations of Y L , one could also rule out such contracts. In the zero output case, failure of a risky project will always result in default. Even if the intermediary can verify the failure at a cost, from an entrepreneur's point of view, the ex ante problem she faces is:
16 Such a static intermediation structure is also considered by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), who use the costly veriÞcation approach pioneered by Townsend (1979) to study the effect of agency costs in amplifying shocks to net worth. While the model here shares certain features with those models, there are important differences as well. They have only one type of project, a risky one, the productivity of which is unobservable and realized after the investment is made. Claims of default due to inability to pay are veriÞed at a cost. Such a costly veriÞcation reveals the output and hence the type of project ("ability"). In our model, there are two types of projects and the mix of the projects undertaken depends on the intermediation costs and realized project potential and all failed projects look alike. Therefore, µ, which is better interpreted as a bankruptcy cost rather than a true veriÞcation cost, plays a less important role in our setup.
where a T is the entrepreneur's true ability, and a C is the ability she claims ("announces"). It is obvious that all entrepreneur's will claim the a C that maximizes proÞts if successful, irrespective of what their true ability a T really is. As elaborated in the appendix, the inability to penalize low ability entrepreneurs in the failed state implies that a scheme in which allocations varied systematically with a would unravel. 17 
The Optimal Allocation
The problem has been written in the tradition of the costly state veriÞcation approach, where agents claim failure truthfully, the claim is veriÞed by the intermediary, and all output (which will be less than the stipulated repayment amount) is collected by the intermediary. 18 Since the proÞt from the safe project is independent of a, and the proÞt from the risky project is increasing in a for any given (i * , r r ), it is clear that the decision rule follows a threshold policy. There exists an a * ² (0, 1], such that all agents with a < a * undertake the safe project, and those with a > a * , undertake the risky project. For the person at the threshold ability, it follows that:
If there is free entry into the intermediation sector, one would expect the contracts offered to exhaust all gains from trade subject to informational constraints. We therefore solve for the contracts offered by maximizing the total surplus to the intermediary and the entrepreneurs. In other words, we envision a country mutual fund that intermediates available capital between projects and guarantees a safe return to investors. The problem is stated directly in terms of the threshold ability, a * , and the capital rented for each type of project, e i and i * . Once we solve for these optimal quantities, the prices that support these quantities in a decentralized setup can be backed out from r s = Y 0 ³ e i´, and r r 17 This argument implicitly assumes that entrepreneurs cannot be "bribed"; this, together with limited liability implies that payoffs to entrepreneurs lie between zero and the output actually produced. 18 The problem has also been written assuming the low state will result in default. This is automatic when Y L is zero. When it is not, the default will occur when
is high enough that the optimal contract would prefer default in the low state to throttling investment to high ability project. That is, the maximized value when the constraint Y L (i * ) > r r (e A + (1 + e B ) i * ) is in place is lower than when this constraint is not in place.
from equation (11) . We deÞne Φ (a * ) as the measure of successful risky projects, and Θ (a * ) as the measure of failed risky projects. That is,
However, more relevant to our results are the following facts. The fraction of successful projects is increasing in a * . That is,
Any factor that causes fewer risky projects to be undertaken in equilibrium (an increase in a * ), for instance an increase in intermediation costs, will increase the quality of projects and the rate of successful completion. For the uninformed intermediary, this quantity can be viewed as the probability that a given project (whose potential she cannot observe) is successful, conditional on it being risky. It therefore follows that the fraction of failed projects,
is decreasing in a * . 19 Given these deÞnitions, the problem of solving for the optimal contract can be written as:
The objective function takes into account the costly state veriÞcation of (truthful) claims of failure of the risky projects. The resource constraint takes into account the iceberg costs involved in intermediating the risky projects. The Þrst order conditions for this problem are:
with (14) holds with equality if a * < 1. It is worthwhile considering the differences between these conditions and the corresponding ones for the full information case. Now there is a single risky investment level, i * , instead of a 19 Given Φ (a * ) ≡ R 1 a * π (a) dF (a) and π 0 > 0, it follows that Φ (a * ) > π (a * ) F (a  *  ) ) . The derivative of the measure of successful projects Φ(a * )
2 , which is positive given the above inequality. different investment for each ability level. The marginal products in (3) are weighted by individual probabilities of success and failure, while here they are weighted by probabilities of success and failure averaged over the risky pool. This hints at the extra effect present in the information constrained economy. An increase in the marginal quality of the risky project reduces the heterogeneity of the risky pool and decreases the inefficiency of capital allocation among them; that is, the tradeoff between directing too much capital toward the low potential project and starving the high potential project of funds becomes less severe. The condition (14) is very similar to (4), except for the cost µ and the fact that the marginal risky project is funded at the same level as any other risky project. Again, an increase in the intermediation cost parameters, e A , e B , exerts an upward pressure on the quality of the marginal project a * , and for high enough costs, it is not proÞtable to fund risky projects even for the most able entrepreneur, and (14) is an inequality.
The quantities that are relevant for our purposes are the output shares that go to entrepreneurs, and therefore the intermediary's share of the output. Since the intermediary is acting on behalf of the investors, this is also the share of funds going to all the individual investors. Given that r s = Y 0 ³ e i´, the intermediary's share from the safe entrepreneurs is F (a * ) Y 0 ³ e i´e i. This share is increasing in a * , and e i. The intermediary's share from the entrepreneurs who undertake the risky project is:
where the Þrst term is the contracted repayment from the successful entrepreneurs, and the second term is the output "conÞscated" from the failed entrepreneurs net of bankruptcy costs. Using (11), we get that the intermediary's total share from the safe and risky projects as:
where y is the maximized output. The return to funds can then be obtained by dividing this share by k t , the total amount of funds available.
In what follows, we argue that:
• The earlier effects that caused the non-monotonicity of returns are also present in this set up.
• There are the following additional effects in this set up, which serve to increase the relative return of capital-rich countries, causing them to dominate poorer countries at lower intermediation costs when compared to the full-information case:
-The threshold quality of risky projects is higher in the informationconstrained case; this is particularly true for rich countries which had low thresholds under full information.
-A given marginal project is relatively overfunded, and the highest ability project is under-funded in the information constrained economy. This inefficiency is likely to decrease whenever the threshold quality increases, say due to an increase in intermediation costs; again, return proÞles of rich countries with lower thresholds are altered most.
Analysis In order to get a sharper characterization of the optimal allocations, we follow the parametrization adopted earlier, in Section 3.2.4. 20 We can write (13) as:
This is the analogue of (5) in the earlier section, with one risky investment level instead of an ability-indexed level. It is easier to see here that the risky project investment relative to that of the safe project increases with the threshold quality. We next derive the relevant equations that determine a * and e i. Using (16) in (14) and after a few algebraic steps we get the following analogue of (6):
is increasing in a * . The left hand side is the ratio of proÞt from the threshold risky project to that of the safe project, which has to equal one if any risky project is undertaken at all; if it is less than one even for the most able entrepreneur (a * = 1) , say when costs are high, no risky projects are undertaken. The numerator of the Þrst term is increasing in a * ; therefore, there is an upward pressure on a * when e A , e B increase. And again, when e A and µ are zero, the increase in a * with e B is immediately apparent. In the appendix we formally show ∂a * ∂e A > 0. Using (16) in (12) we can get the analogue of (7):
20 Such a parametrization yields:
The comments made about Γ (a * ) in (8) are relevant here as well, especially the fact that it decreases with a * . Equations (17) and (18) can be solved for a * and e i, and the latter can be used in (16) to get i * . We can retrieve r s from r s = Y 0 ³ e i´, and r r from (11).
Finally, we examine the effect of increasing e A (and thus a * ) on returns. Except for µ, and the equations determining e i and a * are exactly analogous to those under full information, with e Λ 0 (a * ) > 0 and e Γ 0 (a * ) < 0 as before. Therefore, the opposing effects that cause non-monotonicity in returns are present here also. In the appendix we show that a given marginal project is relatively overfunded, and the highest ability project is under-funded in the information constrained economy; we also show that the threshold ability is higher relative to the full information economy. To see the new effect of an increase in a * on returns, Þrst use (16) in the objective function, to write:
which, except for the bankruptcy cost, has a form similar to (9) . Using this in (15) yields:
Except for the term involving bankruptcy cost, this expression is analogous to (10) . Whereas the second term within curly braces was constant there at
decreases with a * , thereby increasing the intermediary's share and thus the return when costs increase. The wedge between the risky and safe interest rates imposed by the information constrained contract decreases with decreasing heterogeneity in quality, i.e. with an increasing a * . 21 There is also a direct effect coming from observation costs when µ is not zero, with total costs decreasing in a * (that is, with fewer failed projects). As before, in order to quantify the returns implied by this model as k t and e A are both varied, we present numerical results for a set of parameters. Later we discuss the sensitivity of our results to the choice of parameters.
Quantitative Results As mentioned in the discussion of calibration for the full information case, we assume A L = 0. We then choose the technology parameters, A, A H , such that, the k/y ratio for the richest (k = 1) group of countries when intermediation is costless (when e A , e B , µ are zero) is 3, and the gross return is 16%. 22 The values used are A = 0.2462, A H = 0.5459, with A H /A being 2.2. We use α = 0.35 and κ is set to 0.1. The returns for this case are obtained by solving (17) and (18), and calculating imshare/k using (21) for various levels of intermediation costs. Table 4 presents the normalized returns for this economy where differences in human capital as well as physical capital are taken into account. For the case where intermediation costs are set to zero for all the countries, the return ratio for the lowest income country drops to 1.24 relative to the highest income country. We may examine this table in several different ways. For example, if we consider the same intermediation cost for all the economies, we observe that physical and human capital differences are such that the middle income countries dominate in returns over the lowest income country, for any intermediation cost considered. In addition, if we assume differences in intermediation costs, we obtain cases where the rate of return in all the countries, even in the richest, dominate the rate of return in the lowest income country. This result is very different than the one in the pure neoclassical model described in the third column of Table 2 , where the lowest income country dominates in rates of return. The results in this table, which are also repeated in Figure 3 , seem consistent with the stylized facts about capital ßows mentioned in the introduction. Once these closed economies open up, there will be a greater tendency for capital to ßow from the richest to middle income countries rather than to the poorest. 22 Equation (17) pins down a * as a function of A H A in the costless case. Equations (18), (20) and (21) can then be used to solve for A H and A separately to get the above-mentioned capital-output ratio and gross return.
This dominance is stronger when we factor in the higher intermediation costs poorer countries are likely to face. These results are qualitatively similar to the Þndings for the earlier case. However, quantitatively, the threshold level of intermediation costs above which the middle income countries dominate moves to zero in the information constrained economy as opposed to the threshold level around 0.064 for the full information case. The differences between the returns in this economy and the earlier one can also be seen by comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 . As mentioned in the qualitative discussion, the effect of increased returns for the rich countries in the information constrained economy is evident (the curves are closer); the increasing portions of the poor countries all but vanishes. These cause the return to the poorest country in the information constrained economy to be dominated at much lower levels of the intermediation cost as opposed to the full information economy. In Table 5 , we present additional properties of the economy considered above. The Þrst section of Table 5 presents information on total factor productivity that results in these different economies. In order to compare our results to Hall and Jones (1999) who report estimates of total factor productivity for 127 countries in 1985, we use data from our model and use their production function to measure the total factor productivity generated by our model. 23 We normalize total factor productivity in the richest country to 1 and report ratios for the other countries. Our Þndings indicate that, for example, for uniform intermediation costs across countries, the ratio of TFPs of the highest income to lowest income countries ranges between 1.28 to 1.54 depending on the intermediation cost assumed. The estimate Hall and Jones (1999) get for the ratio of total factor productivity of highest to lowest income countries is 3.77. Intermediation costs can therefore go a signiÞcant way in accounting for these differences. In addition, differences in intermediation costs can explain variations in total fac-tor productivity even among countries who are identical with respect to their endowments of physical and human capital. The second panel of Table 5 displays intermediation costs divided by the total quantity intermediated in this economy. The counterpart of this information in the data is what we have displayed in Figure 1 . 24 Our results indicate that intermediation costs per unit intermediated in poor countries can be 10 times higher than that of rich countries if we take, for example, a uniform intermediation cost of 0.016. If we examine the case where poorer countries have higher intermediation costs, we can obtain larger differences. Notice that these costs display non-monotonicity for a given level of capital stock. Moreover, we observe that high levels of intermediation costs for poor countries generate a low equilibrium level of intermediation costs per quantity, perhaps accounting for the experiences of some of the low income countries we had presented in Figure  1 . The last panel of this table documents the bankruptcy costs as a percent of net output for different countries. It is interesting to note that bankruptcy costs may indeed be much lower in poorer countries since fewer risky projects are undertaken in those countries compared to rich countries. In fact, we Þnd that both the fraction of total projects that fail and the fraction of risky projects that fail are higher in richer countries. 25 This implication of the model, which seems consistent with the anecdotal evidence about the incidence of bankruptcies in developing versus developed countries warrants further investigation.
A Dynamic Analysis
So far we have considered returns in a static environment. One interpretation is that the static return is what would accrue to capital in a closed economy. The magnitude of differences in such returns across countries will give us an idea of the incentive for capital to ßow across borders when these economies become integrated. It is best to think of the returns derived in the static case as a function r I (k t ; e A , e B , µ).
Now we consider a two country version of this setup to study the dynamics of capital ßows -local (denoted by the superscript L) and foreign (denoted by the superscript F ). The two countries differ in their (k 0 , e A , e B , µ A ). We focus on the returns in the information constrained economy, though the analysis in the unconstrained case should be similar. The total amount available for projects (assets employed ) in the local country at any time (which will be denoted by f k L t ) is given by:
where D L t is the amount deposited by the local consumers in the foreign mutual fund, and D F t is the amount deposited by the foreigners in the local mutual fund. Here k L t are the assets owned by the local consumers. Given this, the local budget constraint is:
The objective function for the local intermediary will be exactly the one in the closed economy -the supposition is that the intermediary is a proxy not just for local consumers but anybody who chooses to invest in the country mutual fund including the foreign consumers. The r I (·) function will be exactly same as the one above, except k t will be replaced by e k t , and all quantities will be superscripted by L. In other words the same r I (·) that was computed for any given set of cost parameters can be directly used, but with the assets being interpreted as the ones employed locally rather than owned locally. The problem for the foreign intermediary will be identical with F replacing L and vice-versa.
It is clear that during any period, the following equilibrium condition will hold:
and at the integrated steady state will be equal to ρ + δ, if consumers maximize the standard utility functional
If we envision an ε transaction cost of investing in a foreign country, it will be the case that only one of the Ds will be positive. (Equivalently, we can interpret the Ds as net ßows.) Without loss of generality from now on we will assume that D L t = 0 and D F t > 0; that is, the local country is the country with higher return initially, because of lower capital or intermediation cost being in the increasing portion of the return curve or both. 26 It is useful to think of the two country case in the standard neoclassical set up Þrst -in our context, this could be interpreted as having no risky projects available and no human capital differences. That is, the return can be characterized by r I (k t ), is decreasing, and is the same function for all countries.
Analysis: Neoclassical Case
At time zero, we assume k F 0 > k L 0 -either both countries are off their closed steady states or only the foreign country is in its closed steady state; implicit in this assumption is that both countries cannot be on their steady states, for there will be no capital ßow as r I = ρ + δ for both. Given the same r I (·) for both, it follows that for returns to be equalized, we need f
Denoting the average world level of capital as
, we can write r
We will assume CRRA preferences, with risk aversion parameter σ. Consumer optimization in country i implies the usual condition, β
. Given the common return, and commonality of all other parameters, it follows that the ratio of consumption in the two countries is the same in all periods. That is,
, ∀ t. It is reasonable to conjecture that the share parameters for the two countries are,
; that is given the world quantities for consumption, investment, and capital, individual allocations are given by c
, and the consumption ratios are constant at all times, the asset ownership ratios are also constant at all times, and in particular equal to
. Therefore the share parameters are actually time-invariant,
It is easy to verify 26 In this paper we are silent as to why the above-mentioned capital ßow is instantaneous rather than gradual as seen in data. This issue is of independent interest and is the subject of future research; here we conÞne ourselves to studying the magnitude of return differentials that cause such ßows to occur in the Þrst place.
that the individual budget constraints and the constancy of the consumption ratios will be satisÞed with these share parameters. In other words, given the homotheticity of preferences and linearity of budget constraints, we can solve the dynamic system for an integrated world equilibrium, with k
with the initial world capital k
given and r W t as given above. This dynamical system can be solved for the time (transition) paths c 
, substitute for the assets owned in terms of the share parameters to get capital ßows as D
Analysis: Our Model
Here, the r I (·) functions are different for both countries. 27 However, it should be possible to compute an integrated equilibrium as in the neoclassical case, with k
, and the rate of return for any given world capital, r For any given set of cost parameters, the return monotonically decreases in k, so the there is a unique allocation of world capital between the two countries that satisÞes the above condition. Figure 4 plots r I versus k for the country groupings we consider assuming the intermediation cost parameters highlighted in Table 4 . The capital values assumed in that table are marked with asterisks. The observation made while discussing Table 4 , that the second richest country is the one that will get capital inßows when these economies become integrated, is evident here. While a full analysis of integration should include all four types of countries, we start by assuming that the two poorest countries have controls on capital because policy makers fear capital outßow. We computed an integrated equilibrium between the richest and the next richest countries, as described above, using a continuous-time version of the model. For parameters which are new to the dynamic analysis we use, ρ = 0.07, δ = 0.09, σ = 2. If one assumes that capital turns over every period, the ßow monotonically increases to a steady state ßow. If in fact, only new capital ßows in every period, the ßows will correspond to the derivative of this graph, start out at a high value and asymptotically decrease to zero. In reality, the ßows are likely to be in between these two extremes. Conditional on capital ßowing from the richest to the second richest country, there is nothing unusual about this time path. However, it is worth reemphasizing that in the neoclassical model, even when it is augmented to include human capital differences, there would be an outßow from this country to the two poorer countries, which will have less of an incentive in such a regime to impose controls on capital ßows. 
Figure 4: Capital Return vs Capital Employed
A more interesting dynamic exercise is to ask what happens when a previously closed poor country opens up and becomes integrated with a richer country that has a higher return. Contrary to the neoclassical model, the poorer country will experience capital outßow. 28 In this case we can compare the transition of the integrated poor country to that of the poor closed country. We consider countries in the second (e A = .048) and third (e A = .032) quartiles for this integration experiment. We do not show the capital outßow from the poor to rich country, but the panels in Figure 5 compare the income and consumption paths for the poor country during the two transitions. 29 28 Gertler and Rogoff (1990) and Boyd and Smith (1997) show that informational frictions may result in funds ßowing from poor to rich countries. In our model, we get this result even in the Þrst best case where there are no informational fricitions. 29 We have also conducted this experiment by assuming the same intermediation costs (e A = .032) for both countries and found very similar results. The Þrst panel shows that the capital employed in the poor country when it is open is lower than the capital employed, and owned, by it when it is closed, except in the long run; this is the result of capital outßow that occurs in the integrated economy. However, capital owned by the poor country is higher even in the steady state for the open economy. The closed economy is forced to invest all its saving locally, while the open economy gets to invest it in the foreign country and earn higher returns. Therefore, in spite of the lower share of the world capital and income that the open country has to be satisÞed with, it can accumulate more capital over time. This is also evident in the second and third panels, where consumption and income are higher in the open economy during the transition as well as at the steady state (by 5%). The last panel shows the return to the poor country being higher throughout the open transition and approaching the closed economy's return only asymptotically. The consumption supplement that would be required to make an individual in the closed economy as well off as the individual in the open economy turns out to be signiÞcant: 4.23% of consumption in each period. In addition, poor and rich economies in this framework do not converge to the same steady state, mainly due to the persistence of the initial differences in human capital. These results are not unexpected. However, in the standard neoclassical model one cannot even begin to address the issue of poor countries choosing to remain closed for fear of capital outßow, even in the face of overwhelming evidence that such a stance hurts growth. A needs to be in order to equalize the rate of return for the richest country group with that of the poorer country group, and ask whether this value is "reasonable". Analytically, this is easiest to answer in the case in which the poorer country group has a high enough intermediation cost that causes only safe projects to be undertaken there and the richest country group has negligible intermediation costs, a case that is not too far from the facts outlined in the introduction. 31 We can use the earlier expressions to derive the following condition that AH A has to satisfy:
when human capital differences are ignored. The left side is increasing in A needs to be 2.1, which seem much more plausible technology factors. We expand on this plausibility below.
We can see the extra "mileage" we get going from the full information case to the information constrained economy by repeating the exercise we did above; namely, ask what A H A needs to be in order to equalize the rate of return for a poorer country group with that of the richest country group. Again, we seek this answer in the case in which the poorer country group has a high enough intermediation cost that causes only safe projects to be undertaken there and the richest country group has negligible intermediation (and observation) costs. The returns can be obtained from the expressions in the earlier subsection suitably adapted for zero costs. For the k = 0.025 country to have the same return as the k = 1 country, A H A needs to be 8.48 and for the k = 0.1 country to have the same return as the k = 1 country, A H A needs to be 4.17. When human 31 Notice that we are being conservative in this analysis by examining the returns in the poor country versus the rich country instead of the middle income country.
capital differences are taken into account, for the k = 0.025 country to have the same return as the k = 1 country, A H A needs to be 1.91 and for the k = 0.1 country to have the same return as the k = 1 country, AH A needs to be 1.65. These technology ratios are much lower than the corresponding ones for the full information case. When the information inefficiency is taken into account, lower technological differences between the risky and safe technologies are enough to account for empirically observed capital ßows.
One way to assess the empirical plausibility of this technological ratio is to compared the implied TFP ratio between the risky and safe sectors and compare it with observed TFP differences. The ratios in value added per worker summarized by Parente and Prescott (1999) for manufacturing as well as service industries for several industrialized countries fall in the range of 2 to 4. If the capital to effective labor across different sectors within a country are not too different, this range is likely to be the range for TFP differences as well. To be consistent with these ratios for the richest country group when intermediation costs are negligible,
A can be between 2.04 and 2.59 for the Þrst full information case, and between 2.11 and 2.76 for the information constrained case. This is the reason for claiming the plausibility of the above-mentioned technology ratios that are required to have the richest country group to dominate the poorest country groups in capital return.
Non-zero A L
In our numerical results for the economies we examined A L was assumed to be zero. Below we show the results where the values used are A = 0.196, A H = 0.524, and A L = 0.119 and are consistent with a k/y ratio of 3. These results are for the cases where differences in physical and human capital are both taken into account. Table 6 displays the results for the full information and the information constrained cases. As can be seen from these results, the qualitative properties of the Þndings remain unchanged when compared with Tables 3 and 4 , where A L was assumed to be zero. The non-monotonicity of returns in intermediation costs still play an impor-tant role causing countries with lower capital-labor ratios to have lower returns than countries with higher capital-labor ratios. What changes is the threshold level of intermediation costs after which capital ßows to middle income countries. For example, in the information constrained case, the threshold level of intermediation costs goes up from 0.0 in the case of A L = 0, to 0.016 in the above table.
The Role of Bankruptcy Costs
We have computed the rates of return for the information constrained economy, with and without bankruptcy costs to display the impact of bankruptcy costs in this environment. Our results indicate that poorest countries get dominated in rates of return much more frequently when bankruptcy costs are assumed to be non-zero as opposed to zero. Similar to the results above, the threshold level of intermediation costs after which the middle income countries dominate increases in this case as well. Nevertheless, we Þnd that for intermediation costs above 0.048, our model is able to generate returns that are consistent with the stylized fact that capital ßows more to the middle income countries than to the poor countries.
Other Human Capital Measures
The available measures on human capital while all highly correlated differ widely in levels. In the results reported so far, we have used the Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) measure which is the most inclusive one. In this subsection we discuss the implications of using other measures, in particular the ones in Hall and Jones (1999) and the "raw" educational attainment measures in Barro and Lee (1996) . This data is reported in Table 7 . The Hall and Jones measure seems to be most generous in assessing the human capital level of poor countries. While Klenow and Rodriguez would assess the poorest countries to have 14% of the human capital of the richest, Hall and Jones would assess the poorest to have more than a half of the human capital of the richest. The raw Barro and Lee measure falls in between. 32 32 The physical capital levels are much closer across the datasets. The Hall and Jones measure assumes very strong diminishing returns to education beyond 8th grade which might account for a difference between the richest and poorest countries that is much smaller than is found in other data sources. In addition, Klenow-Rodriguez measure includes education as well as on-the-job learning in their measure of human capital.
By choosing the technology parameters A, A H , and A L appropriately one could construct return patterns in which the richer countries dominate, at least for some values of the intermediation cost. The main effect of using the different measures of human capital is to alter the distance between the return curves shown in Figure 3 . The shapes of these curves are preserved. Instead of pursuing this option in great detail, we conduct an analysis very similar to the one in the earlier subsection by asking what A H A needs to be in order to equalize the rate of return for the richest country group with that of a poorer country group. Table 8 shows what this ratio needs to be to have the return of the second quartile group (with high enough intermediation cost) same as that of the highest quartile group (with zero intermediation cost), taking into account human capital differences as estimated by the above-mentioned sources. These ratios appear reasonable, especially in the information constrained economy, when compared to the "admissible" ratios given in the earlier subsection.
Conclusions
We Þnd that a very simple model, which is close to the neoclassical production model in spirit but uses variation in intermediation costs to study the mix of projects undertaken, is capable of accounting for the pattern of capital ßows among countries. The fact that only two new technological parameters (A H , A L ) need to be introduced and calibrated to get a rich variation in returns is a testimonial to this simplicity. We can also get reduced-form expressions for production in our model which closely resemble the aggregate neoclassical production function.
Our study can be improved upon, by collecting more direct data on costs of intermediation and taxes on the intermediation sector and matching model outcomes with them. On the theoretical side, an alternate way to model human capital through the probability function π, is worth pursuing. It would also be interesting to conduct the dynamic analysis with three country groups, rich, middle income, and poor. One could see the effect of capital ßows from both the rich and the poor countries to the middle income countries, at least until the neoclassical effect dominates and the poor country also becomes competitive in returns. For instance, the World Development Report (1999) reports that Algeria, Argentina, Hungary, and Iran, among several other countries, had a net outßow of capital in 1990.
We saw that it was beneÞcial for a poor country to become economically more open even if it experienced a capital outßow. An interesting question to ask in this regard is whether this result holds even if there are productivity improvements arising from local production due to learning by doing. One way of asking this question is, "How strong should learning by doing be before welfare in the closed and open economies are the same?" Finally, it would be very useful to model the development of the intermediation sector; to hold intermediation costs Þxed over long periods of time is not satisfactory. This would also allow us to substantively address the issue of reforms in the Þnancial intermediation sector. These are subjects of ongoing research.
A Appendix
A.1 Full information economy:
∂a * ∂e A > 0 and return is nonmonotonic Differentiate (8) with respect to a * , simplify, and use (6) to get, Γ 0 (a
< 0. Differentiate (7) with respect to e A , use the above expression for Γ 0 (a * ) and simplify to get:
This is the expression given in Section 3.2.4 to explain the non-monotonicity of returns. Differentiate (6) with respect to e A , use above the expression for
∂eA , make use of (7) to get:
,
A.2 Capital-rich countries have weaker substitution effect:
To show this result, we set e B = 0 for simplicity of notation. Differentiate (6) and (7) with respect to k, and simplify to get:
where use is made of (6), to substitute out for
It is clear that we have to show that the denominator (denoted Dr) is increasing in e A to prove the result. Therefore, differentiate the denominator w.r.t. e A , use the fact Γ 0 (a
, and as before, use (6) to substitute out for
to get:
We have seen ∂a * ∂e A > 0. Therefore the sign of the derivative depends on the terms within curly braces. Given the deÞnition of Λ (a * ) in the text, it follows that:
Using these, the terms within curly braces in ∂Dr ∂e A reduce to: 
< 0, where we have set µ = 0 for algebraic simplicity. Differentiate (18) with respect to e A , and get the condition analogous to the full information case:
Next, differentiate (17) with respect to e A , simplify, and use (18) , and the above expression to get:
(1 + eB)
A simple examination of the deÞnition of e Λ (a * ) under the equation (17) In the interest of brevity, and given that nothing crucial hinges on A L being > 0, we present only a sketch of the argument here. Write the maximization problem for allocation of funds among risky projects, conditional on the threshold ability being a * > 0, as:
subject to the following constraints:
(BC) :
where we have imposed π (a) = a, F (a) = a, and neoclassical production functions with A H and A L corresponding to "success" and "failure" states. The Þnancial contract (i (a) , r H (a) , r L (a)) stipulates an investment and a repayment rate for the two possible outcomes. (BC) is the budget constraint, where funds available for the risky projects net of Þxed costs is denoted by b I. (IR) is the individual rationality constraint, which states each risky entrepreneur gets at least the safe project proÞt, π s , in an expected sense; if e i is the investment level, and since safe project funding is devoid of informational problems, this proÞt is (1 − α) A e i α . The Inada condition guarantees positive safe project proÞts, and thus a positive reservation proÞt level. (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which states that every entrepreneur whose true ability is a weakly prefers his "true" contract (i (a) , r H (a) , r L (a)) over a "false" contract
got by claiming ability a C . Implicit are the constraints, r H (a) , r L (a) > 0, which rule out "bribing" the entrepreneurs.
One could analyze this problem and completely characterize the type of contract, but for arguing that there are parameter conÞgurations for which allocations are ability-invariant, this is unnecessary. Instead we examine the (IR) and (IC) constraints to seek a sufficient condition under which abilityvarying contracts will not arise. Denote the net earnings of an ability-a entrepreneur in the two states as w H (a) ≡ A H i (a) α − r H (a) i (a) and w L (a) ≡ A L i (a) α − r L (a) i (a) ,and write the (IC) constraint as:
The left hand side is the loss to an entrepreneur at the bad state of overstating his ability and the term within curly braces on the right hand side is his gain in the good state. The probability weighted loss from lying has to outweigh the probability weighted gain from lying to satisfy incentive compatibility. Less able entrepreneurs are likely to be most responsive to a penalty in their highly probable low state. An ability-varying incentive compatible contract cannot have w H (a) = constant, ∀ a ² [a * , 1]. If this were so, everyone would claim to have ability a C ² arg max (w L (a)). The only surviving contract then stipulates w L (a) = constant, ∀ a ² [a * , 1], and thus the contract cannot be ability-varying to begin with. Indeed, if w H is the same for any two ability levels, their w L s will also have to be same.
For a 2 > a 1 we can show we cannot have w H (a 2 ) < w H (a 1 ). Suppose not. The (IC) for the a 1 entrepreneur relative to a 2 is:
. Given the supposition, the left hand side is positive. Since a 2 > a 1 , the above inequality then implies a 2 w H (a 1 )+(1 − a 2 ) w L (a 1 ) > a 2 w H (a 2 ) + (1 − a 2 ) w L (a 2 ) . In other words, the (IC) for the a 2 entrepreneur relative to a 1 is violated. These arguments show that w H (a) needs to be increasing in an ability varying contract. Moreover, w H (1) > w H (a * ) in such a contract; if w H (1) = w H (a * ) , all the intermediate ability levels need to have the same w H as well, and we are back in the realm of ability-invariant contracts. The candidate ability-varying contracts feature strictly increasing w H or a step function (with the w L s being equated across ability levels within each step).
Consider the lowest ability entrepreneur in the pool, a * . A sufficient condition for this entrepreneur to claim an ability of 1 under an ability-varying contract can be found by letting the left hand side of (22) take its maximum possible value. The maximum the left hand side can be (without bribes) is A L i (a * ) α , that is give the low ability entrepreneur his entire output. Given w H (1) > w H (a * ) , as argued above, we can write the {w H (1) − w H (a * )} on the right hand side, without loss of generality, as εA e i α , for some ε > 0. Therefore, a sufficient condition is ALi(a * )
α εA e i α < a * 1−a * . Note that this condition is automatically satisÞed when A L = 0. In that case, there is no way to penalize the low ability person because he has nothing to lose when he gets the low state. Therefore, as argued in the main text, no ability-varying scheme is possible. To get a bound on A L in the case where it is not zero, use the upper bound on , and write the sufficient condition for the a * entrepreneur to claim to be of type 1 as:
If a non-discriminatory contract is not possible between a * and 1, as argued above it not possible for intermediate ability levels as well. The above condition is very stringent; but for our purposes of arguing that for small enough positive perturbations of A L we can still have ability-invariant contracts offered by the intermediary, this argument suffices. ¤ A.5 The information-constrained a * is higher This is easiest to illustrate when we examine the zero cost case. The relevant marginal qualities are given by e Λ (a * SB ) = 1 and Λ (a * F B ) = 1 for the information constrained and the full information cases respectively. It can be seen that e Λ (0) < Λ (0), e Λ (1) = Λ (1), and given that both functions are increasing the stated property follows. ¤
A.6 Inefficiency of funding in the information-constrained case
First, we analyze the inefficiency in funding of risky projects. When (5) is evaluated at a given a * and compared with (16) it is easy to see the full-information ratio is lower, since a * A H
A . Likewise, when (5) is evaluated at a = 1, the ratio in the full-information case is higher, since
A for any information constrained economy a * between zero and one. In other words, a given marginal project is relatively overfunded in the information constrained case, and the highest ability project is under-funded. This inefficiency is likely to decrease whenever a * increases, say due to an increase in intermediation costs; that is, whenever there is not too much heterogeneity in the quality of risky projects undertaken. The ratio of funding of the highest ability risky project to the lowest ability risky project in the full-information case is , which decreases with a * and approaches one when a * → 1. This ratio is always one in the information constrained case. Therefore the deviation from the full information allocation decreases as the information constrained a * decreases and vanishes as a * → 1. ¤
